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This work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and 
ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme 
with two penalties (accountability and non-report) is able to induce the first-best solution. However, 
this scheme needs not imply a punitive environment, but may, under given circumstances, yield 
insignificant and even negative penalties. Alternative incentive systems, such as voluntary reporting 
and legal immunity, are found to have less desirable properties. An exception is the principle of 
confidentiality (anonymity) which turns out to be an optimal scheme. It is also shown that when a 
judicial upper limit is binding, for the non-report penalty, it becomes rationale to go “soft” on the 
accountability penalty.   
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1.    Introduction  
The focus on medical error prevention has increased the last few years most probably because of the 
publication To err is human by The Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences (see 
Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson, 1999). The report received massive attention and the main 
conclusions were that health care is a risky business since iatrogenic injuries are common and that 
errors involve considerable costs.
1 As much as 100 000 Americans a year could be dying from 
preventable errors with many more incurring various injuries.
2 The total U.S. national costs for 
adverse events are estimated to be between $37.6 and $50 billion while for preventable adverse events 
they are between $17 and $29. Brennan et al., (1991) reviewed the medical charts of more than 30 000 
patients in USA, admitted to 51 different acute care hospitals, and found that injuries caused by 
medical management occurred in 3.7% of the admissions. The same data were also analysed by Leape 
et al., (1993) which concluded that 69% of the injuries were caused by errors. An Australian study of 
28 hospitals reported that adverse events occurred in 16.6% of admissions resulting in permanent 
disability in 13.7% of patients and death in 4.9%, while 51% of the adverse events were considered to 
be preventable. Observational studies have identified even higher rates of error and injury from 
medical care (see for example the survey by Weingart et al., (2000) and the references therein).  
 
 
Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson (1999) define a medical error as an adverse event or near miss that is 
preventable with the current state of knowledge.
3 However the occurrences of such errors need not 
involve liability nor imply individual failures. Reason (2000) classifies medical failures into active and 
latent failures where active failures are unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact with 
the patient while latent conditions are error provoking conditions (system failures) such as time 
pressure, understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue and inexperience. So far control systems have 
focused mainly on responsible individuals, neglecting the fact that most serious faults involve multiple 
system failures and the involvement of many health care workers. Humans are fallible and errors are to 
be expected and the blaming of individuals and the isolation of unsafe acts from their system context 
should be replaced by the search for system failures and the targeting of institutions. Additionally, 
effective risk management depends crucially on establishing a reporting culture. Another conclusion 
from the literature is that errors or incidents appear to be significantly underreported (Kohn, Corrigan 
and Donaldson, 1999). Cullen et al., (1995) finds, for example, that errors are underreported by a 
factor of 10. Barach and Small (2000) refers to literature for which the underreporting of adverse 
events is estimated to range from 50%-96% annually. 
                                                           
1 Other recent and important publications on this topic are DH (2000) and Runciman and Moller (2001). 
2 In the U.S. medical errors result in 44 000-98 000 unnecessary deaths each year and 1 000 000 excess injuries 
(Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson, 1999).  
3 Near misses are events that could have resulted in an accident, injury or illness, but did not, while adverse 
events are injuries caused by medical management that results in measurable disability.   3
The literature on medical errors stresses the importance of learning from failure and that reporting is 
fundamental to the broader goal of error reduction. Underreporting represents costly information 
losses since regulatory bodies and health-care institutions themselves could systematically report, 
register, analyse and disseminate such data and translate them into useful information.
4 In the literature 
there has been a debate on the adequacy of punitive versus non-punitive incentive programs.
5 Punitive 
programs are believed to act as barriers because of legal risk and the fear of malpractice suits, patient 
anger, as well as being a negative signal on practitioners’ incompetence (reputation damage).
6 Leape 
and Berwick (2000) find that responsible professionals, being involved in medical errors, feel the 
sense of guilt and remorse, and that a current culture of “blaming, naming and shaming” represents an 
obstacle to error reporting since it becomes unsafe to admit error and explore why errors occur. In a 
study by Rosenthal (1995), a strong norm of not criticising among medics is identified. The same 
study also reports of the existence of self-regulatory mechanisms believed to be quite ineffective in 
dealing with incompetent doctors. As a consequence, incentive programs being characterised as less 
punitive, such as voluntary reporting, confidentiality and immunity, have been suggested to replace 
present systems. 
 
The demand for non-punitive environments to create incentives for reporting seems to contradict 
conclusions in the economic literature where compliance with a law is believed to increase with the 
penalty imposed upon conviction (see e.g. Becker, 1968). Maximum enforcement at lowest possible 
costs is achieved by tough penalties combined with an insignificant amount of resources to detect non-
compliance. The intention of this paper is to provide some insights on the role of incentives in 
association with medical errors and discuss to what extent a punitive or non-punitive environment is 
the adequate one. Consequently, the paper is concerned with the design of optimal malpractice or 
liability systems.
7 In doing so an analytical model is presented which describes a relationship between 
a regulator and an institution (a team of health care workers or a responsible physician). The regulator 
is to design an optimal incentive structure for preventing medical errors while on the same time 
inducing physicians to report about errors once they occur. Two possible penalties are introduced into 
the model - one that concerns accountability (ex-ante) and one that concerns reporting incentives (ex-
post). The physicians face a two step decision process where they first are to decide on preventive 
                                                           
4 One suggestion is to record all information in a computerised database parallel to what have been done in 
sectors with well-developed reporting systems like aviation and the nuclear industry. However, errors in the 
health care industry differ from those in these industries being less visible and dramatic and concerns one patient 
at a time while damages happen to a third party. Hence the optimal design of incentives must differ. 
5 See ISMP (1999) and articles published in an issue of the British Medical Journal (No. 7237, 18 March, 2000).  
6 In the literature the concepts of mandatory and voluntary reporting systems are frequently applied. Kohn, 
Corrigan and Donaldson (1999) define mandatory reporting as systems that hold providers accountable for 
performance where regulatory bodies have the authority to investigate specific cases and issue penalties or fines 
for wrong-doing. However, penalties for not reporting errors are not explicitly mentioned in this publication.  
7 The model set-up draws upon former works on environmental compliance such as Greenberg (1984), 
Harrington (1988) and Heyes (1996).     4
effort to reduce the risk of errors, and secondly, if a preventable error has occurred, to decide on 
whether to report the incident or not. The occurrence of an error is assumed to provide the physicians 
with private information which can influence their reporting decision. The model combines moral 
hazard with adverse selection and all agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. 
 
The economic literature on medical errors is concerned with the impact liability has on pricing and 
income (Jensen et al., 1999 and Danzon et al., 1990), medical malpractice insurance (Thornton, 1999), 
and the optimal design of insurance schemes (Sloan, 1990). Danzon (2000) views these analyses as 
extensions of economic analysis on tort liability presented by Posner (1972), Brown (1973) and 
Shavell (1980), where the deterrence function of liability is discussed. In addition there is evidence on 
liability reforms to reduce medical expenses without important consequences on health outcomes [see 
e.g. Localio (1993), Dubay et al., (1999), Kessler and McClellan (1996)] - findings that suggest the 
practicing of defensive medicine.
8 To my knowledge, the health economic literature has not focused at 
reporting incentives. However, the topic is formerly treated in literature on tax compliance and the 
enforcement of pollution standards (see e.g. Andreoni et al., 1998 and Malik, 1993). This paper, 
however, differs from the above mentioned works since the reporting of decisions provides additional 
gains in terms of information that reduce the future problem. The paper is organised as follows. First, a 
punitive incentive model is presented and an optimal penalty scheme derived. Secondly, the model is 
modified in order to analyse the consequences from less punitive schemes such as voluntary reporting, 
the principle of confidentiality and legal immunity. Finally, the impact from the presence of 
institutional barriers on the optimal penalties is discussed 
 
2.  The optimal penalty scheme.  
The model presented in this section analyses the incentives of health care workers that is exposed to 
the risk of committing medical errors.
9 The regulator is concerned both with the expected social costs 
that accrue from errors and informational gains. The physicians undertake a two-step decision 
process.
10 First, they decide on how much effort to invest in costly preventive activities to avoid the 
occurrences of preventable errors, where the effort level is unobservable for the regulator. After 
treatment of a patient, the physician privately observes whether an error has occurred or not, and if so, 
whether to report the incidence promptly to the regulator or not.  
 
                                                           
8 Kessler and McClellan (2002) define defensive medicine as “precautionary treatment with minimal expected 
medical benefit out of fear of legal liability”. 
9 Throughout the paper, errors, preventable errors and medical errors are applied to describe adverse events and 
near misses being preventable with the current state of knowledge. 
10 The observed tendency to blame individuals rather than to place responsibility on institutions is challenged in 
several works (see Reason, 2000 and Reinertsen, 2000). This work is not concerned with what level to put the 
blame, however, in the text we use physicians as the responsible agent.      5
In the following p(e) denotes the probability of a preventable error to occur, where e is the effort 
invested in reducing this probability. p(e) is continuous, twice differentiable, negative, and a strictly 
decreasing function in effort; 
'' ' 0, 0 ee e pp <> .  Hence, preventive effort is here assumed to influence 
the probability of errors only, and not the distribution of outcomes. The value of e is unobservable (or 
not verifiable) for the regulator.  
 
At the end of the first period, for a given e, physicians observe privately whether a preventable error 
has occurred or not. The actual occurrence of a preventable error is private information for physicians 
and such incidents also provide them with private information on what type of error which occurred. 
Four possible types of errors are assumed differing with respect to the probability of being held liable 
for a medical error if they become common knowledge. The types of errors are classified according to 
the degree of social costs inflicted and the physician’s own perception of the quality of evidence. 
H D and L D are the two types of social costs that may follow from a preventable error where 
H L DD > .
11  These costs include patient injury and discomfort as well as costs following from 
treatment costs such as rehabilitation, increased hospital stay and additional medical expenses.
12 For 
each category of costs there are two possible outcomes w.r.t. the quality of evidence. In this way we 
end up with four types of errors where  HH r and  HL r denote the exogenous liability probabilities for 
high damage events, H D , with a high quality and a low quality of evidence, respectively, where 
HHH L rr > . For low damage events, L D ,  LH r and  LL r now denote the same two liability probabilities, 
where  LHL L rr > .
13 The occurrences of preventable errors need not imply judicial liability since errors 
can not always be attributed to carelessness or incompetence, because of inherent scientific and 
clinical uncertainties, and due to the inability to meet standard of proofs.   
 
Given an incidence, physicians face two options - whether to report about the incidence to the 
regulator (self-report) or to lie low (non-report). It is assumed that both choices involve expected costs 
for the physicians beyond the penalties imposed by the regulator (see e.g. Wu, 2000). Given the 
decision to self-report, a cost, b , is experienced which is to reflect patient anger, the feeling of being 
singled out, exposed, and one’s competence questioned (adverse publicity and reputation losses) in the 
following denoted as the shame-parameter.
14  For physicians who decide to keep silent about errors, a 
                                                           
11 If 
L D  is set equal to zero it can be interpreted as a medical near miss. DH (2000) considers near misses as free 
lessons.  
12 Costs from lost income and household production costs can also be included.  
13 The model could also be presented more simplistically by assuming two types of errors. It is here chosen to 
introduce four types to stress the heterogeneity which prevail as concerning medical errors. The number of 
possible equilibria in the model increases with the number of error types (see section 4).  
14 Sexton, Thomas and Helmreich (2000) report that more than half of the intensive care staff finds it difficult to 
discuss mistakes because of personal reputation and possible disciplinary actions.    6
parametera is introduced (guilt-parameter) to reflect the fear of being discovered as well as moral 




In the case of non-reporting, any physician faces the possibility of being detected by the patient, the 
patient family, by colleagues, or by medical audits. A unique relationship is assumed between the level 
of damage, i D , and the exogenous probability of detection, if choosing not to self-report, 
i q ( H L qq > ). The rationale behind this assumption is the belief that preventable errors with outcomes 
that inflict much discomfort for the patient, is more difficult to hide from the regulator.  
 
The regulator has two instruments (penalties) at her disposal to influence physician behaviour. First, a 
penalty, t, imposed if the physician is being held liable for a preventable error. This penalty, in the 
following denoted as the accountability penalty, is the same independent of how the incident was 
revealed to the regulator. Second, the regulator may impose a penalty, s (non-report penalty), for those 
who fail to report about an incidence and are being detected. Consequently, an individual choosing not 
to self-report, but is detected and held liable, is penalised by ts + , while an self-reporting individual 
being held liable faces the penalty t , only.
  The timing of the game is shown in figure 1where agents 
decide on effort before they privately know whether an error will occur and what type of error (ex-
ante), while the reporting decision is made after receiving private information (ex-post).  
 
 
Figure 1: The timing of the game  
 
From the above assumptions it follows that physicians differ with respect to whether or not they 
experience a preventable error, and if they do, what type of error. The occurrence of errors and their 
true type is not observed by the regulator, but their probability distribution is common knowledge. 
                                                           
15 The professional’s feeling of guilt and remorse may include concerns for the patient experiencing errors. It 
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imposed   7
Social (patient) costs and the detection probabilities is assumed to take the values  H D ,  H q  and  L D , 
L q  with probabilities β  and 1 β − , the liability probabilities for high damage errors takes the values 
HH r and  HL r  with probabilities γ and 1 γ − , while the liability probabilities for low damage errors 
takes the values  LH r and  LL r  with probabilities µ and 1 µ − . The parameters β ,γ ,µ ,a and b are all 
common knowledge.
16 (A map of the decision process is presented in the Appendix).  
 
In the following, the second stage decision is described (ex-post). Physicians, at this stage of the game, 
know whether a preventable error has occurred and which type they are confronted with. The expected 
pay-offs, given the occurrence of a preventable error of type ij, are;  
 
(1 )0 ij ij ij ij S R br t r br t =+ +− =+     w h e r e  , iH L =  and  , j HL =        (1) 
[( )( 1 ) ] ( ) ij i ij ij i ij NR a q r t s r s a q r t s =+ + +− =+ +  where  , iH L =  and  , jH L =        (2) 
 
where  ij SR denotes the expected pay-off if the preventable error is reported to the regulator, while 
ij NR is the expected pay-off if the physician fail to report the incident. It is observed from eq.(1) that 
the expected self-report pay-off is the sum of the shame parameter and the expected accountability 
penalty being the product of the actual probability of being held liable,  ij r , and the accountability 
penalty itself, t . The expected non-report pay-off (see eq. 2) is the sum of the parameter reflecting 
guilt, the expected non-report penalty if being detected, and the expected accountability penalty if 
being detected and held liable. It is observed that the self-report pay-off, ij SR , depends on the 
accountability  penalty, t, only, while the pay-off relevant for the other mode of behaviour,  ij NR  is a 
function of both penalties (t  and s ).   
 
The condition which ensures that physicians self-report, given the occurrence of an error of type ij, 
denoted the optimal self-report rule, is;  
 
() ( 1 ) ij ij ij i ij i ij i SR NR b r t a q s r t b a q s r t q ≤⇒ + < + + ⇒ − < + −     , iH L =  and  , j HL =        (3) 
 
It follows from eq. (3) that if the “shame” associated with self-reporting is significantly higher than the 
“guilt” that goes with lying low (a non-reporting culture; 0 mba ≡ −>), a high non-report penalty 
                                                           
16 In this paper individuals differ w.r.t what errors they experience while the parameters a and b are assumed to 
be the same for all individuals and all types of errors. As follows from (3), the reporting decision does not 
depend on the absolute level of a and b but their relative size.       8
(s ) and a low accountability penalty (t) are needed to induce health care workers to self-report. The 











   where  , iH L =  and  , j HL =            (4) 
 
It is observed from (4) that the marginal increase in expected pay-offs from a higher accountability 
penalty is higher for self-reports than for non-reports, since non-reporters may evade a penalty. Hence, 
an increasing accountability penalty weakens the incentives for self-reporting. It follows from (3) that 
for a detection probability close to zero, self-reporting can only occur in guilt-dominated cultures (a 
reporting culture;  0 mba ≡−<). Finally, it is observed that for given values of tand  s , individuals 
may choose differently depending on the type of errors they experience.  
 
The expected pay-off (penalty) function, for a physician, after observing a preventable error ij (ex-





ij ij i ij
ij
ii j i j ii j
b rt i fb rt a q rt s
Rt s
a q rt s i fb rt a q rt s
++ ≤ + + 
=  ++ + > ++ 
       where  , iH L =  and  , jH L =        (5) 
 
The expected penalty function, given the occurrence of an error, but before knowing what type of error 
has occurred (ex-ante) is;  
 
{ } { } (, ) m i n ; [ ] ( 1 )m i n ; [ ]
a
HH HH H HL HL H R ts b r t a r t sq b r t a r t sq βγ β γ =+ + + + − + + + +       (6) 
{ } { } (1 ) min ; [ ] (1 )(1 ) min ; [ ] LH LH L LL LL L brt a rts q br t a r ts q βµ β µ −+ + + + − − + + +   
 
The first period decision (ex-ante), where physicians are to decide on the amount of resources to invest 




e Min C e p e R t s =+                     ( 7 )  
Physicians are assumed to minimise the sum of preventive costs, e, and the expected costs associated 
with preventable errors, being the product of the probability and the expected (ex-ante) penalty   9
function, in the following denoted as the expected physician costs;
p C . It also follows that the 
outcome of not experiencing a preventable error with probability, 1 () p e − , is assumed to equal zero.
17  
 
In order to derive the first-best penalties we need to define the optimal (social) level of preventive 
effort and make assumptions about the value of information following from self-reporting and non-
reporting behaviour. The optimal preventive effort level is determined by the following expression;  
 
* argmin ( )
r
e
eC e p e D ≡= +                 ( 8 )  
where   (1 ) H L DD D ββ =+ −                                (9) 
    
D is the expected patient (social) costs following from preventable errors, while
r C is the expected 
regulator (social) costs. Hence, the optimal preventive effort, 
* e , is the level which equates the 
marginal increase in effort costs (the marginal deterrence cost) with the marginal decline in expected 
patient costs (marginal deterrence benefit). The quality of information from errors that become 
common knowledge is the same across all types of errors and the information quality (or quantity) 
does not depend on the way it becomes common knowledge – whether self-reported or detected. The 
quality of information is normalised to 1, which implies that the expected quality of information is 1 
and  i q , for self-reported errors and non-reported errors, respectively.
18 Since the regulator is 
indifferent to the information source, she is always better off, given self-reporting behaviour. The 
above discussion makes evident why the first–best solution is one where all physicians are self-
reporting and where each of them invest 
* e into preventive effort. At this stage it is, for ethical 
reasons, chosen not to introduce a social welfare function e.g. defined in informational benefits (lower 
future probability of errors due to learning) and social costs (
r C ). Such an approach could produce an 
optimal preventive effort level being less than 
* e , since lower efforts increase the expected benefits 
that arise from information simply by increasing the expected number of errors.
19 
 
It is observed that moral costs (feelings of shame and guilt) are not included in the social cost function 
in (8) since it is not obvious that costs such as provider discomfort associated with non-compliance to 
law (non-reporting), patient anger, and the fear of being detected are to be considered as social ones.  
                                                           
17 The model is not explicitly related to provider health insurance being a shield against financial claims and 
litigation expenses. However, the model may also be interpreted within such a context where t can represent non-
financial liability costs e.g. time costs associated with legal processes.    
18 In this paper, the focus is not on how to analyse and use information in order to translate negative results into 
useful information. Here, the approach is quite simple, where the number of collected reports is assumed to 
increase the quantity of information, hence creating an increasing awareness and a reduction of the problem.    
19 The minimization problem in (8) rules out the possibility of such a trade-off is here ruled out (lexicographic 
preferences).   10
One the other hand, feelings of guilt and remorse and concern for the patient could well be included 
e.g. by introducing a parameter that reflects the fraction of moral costs considered as social costs (see 
also footnote 20 and Lewin and Trumbull (1990) for a discussion of the social value of offences).  
 
The optimal penalty scheme is now straightforward to derive, since the regulator induces self-
reporting by setting the non-report penalty, s , sufficiently high for any level of t. The setting of t, on 
the other hand, is guided by the objective to induce optimal preventive effort, 
* e . Given the level of 
* ss = , which ensures that all physicians are self-reporting independent of their type, the ex-ante 
expected penalty function becomes;   
   
* ( , ) [ ] (1 )[ ] (1 ) [ ] (1 )(1 )[ ]
a
SR HH HL LH LL R ts b r t b r t b r t b rt βγ β γ β µ β µ =++ − + + − + + − −+          (10) 
 




SR R ts , to equal the expected patient costs that follow from a preventable 
error,  D. Now, all societal costs are internalised by the decision-maker. The formal representation of 
this condition is;     
 
** (1 ) ( , )
a
HL S R DD D R t s ββ =+ − =                ( 1 1 )      
 
Rearranging (11), using (10), yields the following expression;   
 
* (1 )
[ (1 ) ] [(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]
HL
HHH L L H L L
Db D D b
t
rr r r r
ββ
βγ β γ β µ β µ
−+ − −
==
+− + − + − −
,         (12) 
 
where  r  denotes the expected liability probability. It follows from (12) that 
* t is to be positive if the 
expected social costs from a preventable error exceed the shame parameter. In this situation, the 
decision-maker is not internalising all social costs and a positive penalty is necessary to get the 
incentives right. If the opposite is the case, defensive medicine is expected, and 
* t must be negative. It 
is also observed from (12) that 
* t is to decrease with the expected liability probability, r .
20     
 
                                                           
20 The first-best accountability penalty changes if moral costs are included into the social cost function. Let ω be 
the fraction of moral costs that enters the social cost function where 01 ω < < . The first-best penalty now 
becomes; 




= , which implies a higher 
* t for any D , b and r compared to (12).     11
The next step for the regulator, given 
* tt = , is to set the non-report penalty as to induce self-reporting 
from all decision-makers, irrespective of the types of errors experienced. To solve this problem I first 
define levels of  ij s that make the optimal self-report rule binding for each type of errors. This is done 
by using (3) which provides us with the following four critical levels;  
 







=  where , iH L =  and  , jH L =               (13) 
 
where  ij s is the lowest possible value s can attain, for an error of type ij, and on the same time induce 
self-reporting behaviour.  The first-best non-report penalty becomes;   
 
{ } *m a x ij sS ≥ .               ( 1 4 )  
 
The expression in (14) says that the optimal non-report penalty is to equal (or to be higher than) the 
highest critical value of s defined (13). We know by assumption that  HHH L ss >  and  LH LL ss > . 
Furthermore, we assume that  . LH HH ss >
21 Hence, errors of type LH (near miss and high quality of 
evidence), characterised by a low probability of detection, and a high liability probability, become the 
relevant ones. The optimal non-report penalty is,     
 
*







≥=             ( 1 5 )  
The first-best penalty, 
* s , described in (15), implies by definition that errors of type LH are self-
reported. The same penalty also induces all other types of errors to be self-reported, since for any level 
of t and s , the incentives are least significant for such errors. If eq. (15) is binding, 
* s increases with 
the shame parameter and the accountability penalty, but decreases with the guilt-parameter and the 
detection probability.  
 
The optimal penalty scheme is summarised below;  





=               ( 1 6 )  
                                                           
21 This assumption is satisfied if;   () * (1 ) (1 ) LH L H L H H H H L
m
qq r q qr q q
t
−< − − −    12
*
*







bq a D q
mrt q rr s
qq
 −− − + −  +− ≥=              (17) 
In table 1 the optimal penalties are signed, given a particular ranking of the parameters a ,  b  and 
expected patient costs, D.
22 The sign of the accountability penalty is uniquely determined by the size 
of social costs relative to the shame parameter, while the sign of the non-report penalty depends both 
 
         Table 1: The signs of first-best penalties  




D = b 
 
D < b 
 
m≡a-b > 0 
* t  >   0 
* s  > 0 
* t =   0 
* s  > 0 
* t <   0 
* s ≥ 0 
 
m≡a-b= 0 
* t >   0 
* s > 0 
* t =   0 
* s = 0 
* t <   0 
* s = 0 
 
m≡ a-b< 0 
* t >  0 
* s ≥ 0 
* t =  0 
* s = 0 
* t <   0 
* s = 0 
 
 
on the sign of 
* t and whether the medical culture is shame- or guilt dominated. A positive 
accountability penalty implies a positive non-report penalty. The non-report penalty is positive (or 
zero) independent of the sign of 
* t in non-reporting cultures (m>0). This is because the costs of self-
reporting are quite significant in shame-dominated cultures, so that 
* s needs to be positive to ensure 
self-reporting. It also follows that the penalty scheme is most punitive forDba >>, while the 
opposite ranking yields a non-report penalty equal to zero and a negative accountability penalty.  
  
Our model induces the first-best and the optimal penalty scheme needs not be a punitive one. 
Depending on the value of the parameters of guilt, shame and expected patient costs, penalties can be 
low, equal to zero and even negative. A non-punitive environment may, under some circumstances, be 
a necessary condition for getting the incentives right. Numerous recommendations in the literature on 
medical errors recommend a non-punitive environment (see the references in footnote 5), however, 
these suggestions are not conditioned upon specific conditions but appear as universal solutions.  
   13
Section 3:  Voluntary reporting, confidentiality, and immunity. 
Much literature on errors stresses the need for creating safe environments and suggests the application 
of less punitive measures such as voluntary reporting, immunity and confidentiality. In this section 
such reforms are discussed. However, a problem with this literature is the absence of a precise 
definition of the above concepts, consequently we present below our own interpretations. In the 
following four alternative systems are discussed and each system is defined by modifying the optimal 
self-report rule [see (3)]. The four alternatives are;
23    
 
Absent non-report penalty:        ij i ij br t aq r t θ +≤+  01 θ < <                     (18) 
Immunity:                 ii j i ba q r t q s ≤ ++                         (19) 
Confidentiality:           12 [] ii j i i j i bq br t aq r tq s λ λ ++ ≤ + +   1 01 λ < < ,  2 01 λ < <          (20) 
Voluntary reporting:      1ba λ θ ≤                           (21) 
    
It follows from (18) – (21) that the shame and guilt parameters are adjusted by the parameters  i λ  and 
θ , respectively, to reflect the possibility that the absence of penalties may have an impact on feelings 
of guilt and shame. If the following each of the above conditions will be compared to the optimal self-
report rule presented in eq. (3). 
 
An Absent non-report penalty causes two changes in (3). First, the non-report penalty, s , is not an 
option for the regulator anymore since the act of non-reporting is not associated with the threat of 
sanctions. Second, the guilt parameter, a , is deflated by introducing a parameter θ where 0<θ<1. The 
parameter θ reflects that guilt now is lower, compared to a system with strict liability, since the failure 
to report is not considered a law violation. The accountability property of the model, however, is kept 
due to the presence of t for both modes of behaviour. Their presence implies that ex-ante incentives 
can be adjusted so that optimal preventive effort follows. However, the absence of a non-report 
penalty, may represent a hindrance for reaching the first-best solution. To see this consider the 
sufficient condition for Absent non-report penalty to induce self-reporting for all types of errors;   
 
*







,                ( 2 2 )  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22 If the condition described in (17) is not binding for the optimal value of the accountability penalty, 
* s is set 
equal to zero.  
23 It is here chosen to ignore the costs of implementing and running the various schemes.    14
where t* is defined in (12). If 
* t >0  and a non-reporting culture ( 0 m > ), it follows that optimality is 
unattainable since errors of type LH will not be reported.      
 
The principle of immunity (see 19), is here interpreted as if the probability of being held liable, 
conditional on self-reporting behaviour, is equal to zero ( 0 ij r =  if self-reporting). Consequently, the 
risk of being held liable, given the occurrence of an error, is relevant only if failing to report.
 The first-
best solution is now unattainable, since the regulator is left without any instruments to influence 
preventive behaviour. However, the regulator may still induce self-reporting behaviour, since being 
left with two instruments (t and s ) to ensure this mode of behaviour. Only if b =D, which implies 
that 
* ee = , can the first-best solution be reached.   
 
Confidentiality implies that the identity of self-reporting individuals is not revealed to others but the 
receivers of the actual information (protected from legal discovery).
24  It follows from (20) that three 
modifications are now undertaken to represent this principle. First, the shame parameter is deflated by 
the parameter,λ , to reflect a lower burden (shame) when information is given under confidentiality. 
Second, the expected penalty for being held liable is changed from  ij br t +  to  2 ii i j qbq r t λ + , to capture 
that the act of confidential self-reporting, needs not to trigger a judicial process.
25 However, 
confidential self-reporting does not imply immunity. An error may still be detected by others, as a 
consequence, the expected accountability penalty that matters for a confidential self-report coincides 
with the expected penalty for failing to report. Third, the detection of a confidentially reported error is 
also assumed to involve shame, but to a lower extent, represented by the parameter
2 λ . The regulator 
now possesses two instruments, one for each objective, and the first–best solution is attainable. The 
only difference, as compared to the model in section 2, is that the accountability penalty does not any 
longer change the relative incentives between the two modes of behaviour. This observation, ceteris 
paribus, has two implications. First, the accountability penalty must now be higher, relative to the 
model of section 2, to induce optimal preventive effort, since confidential reporting lowers the 
expected penalty associated with self-reporting with the value  i q . Secondly, the non-report penalty 
can be lower, since higher values of tdo not worsen the incentives for self-reporting, as was the case 
for the model presented in section 2.    
 
                                                           
24 The intent of anonymous reporting is to ensure that the reporter cannot be identified from the report. 
Confidentiality differs from Anonymity in that analysts can not contact reporters for more information in the 
latter.   
25 A possible way of doing this is to let the report be handled by an independent bureau having an obligation to 
protect it’s source.   15
The fourth case, denoted Voluntary reporting, is here assumed to be a completely non-punitive system, 
( 0 ts ==). Now, the self-report rule becomes  1ba λ θ ≤ , saying that self-reporting becomes optimal 
only in  reporting cultures.
26 The absence of any formal penalty implies that no regulatory instruments 
are available, neither to induce self-reporting nor to induce optimal preventive effort. The first-best is 
realised only if  1 Db a λ θ =≤ .   
 
Confidentiality has the same ability as the model presented in section 2 to induce the first-best 
solution. For Absent non-report penalties and Immunity, on the other hand, this is not the case. Absent 
non-report penalty is unable to create incentives to make physicians to self-report (ex-post incentives). 
The principle of Immunity represents an inability to influence preventive effort (ex-ante incentives). In 
a pure non-punitive system (Voluntary reporting), both above problems are present, which implies that 
even if professional ethics solves the problem of self-reporting,  1ba λ θ ≤ , ex-ante incentives still 
remain incorrect.  
 
The proponents of non-punitive systems stress the importance of creating reporting cultures and points 
to penalties as disincentives for self-reporting. The analysis undertaken in this paper confirms this 
view for twith the exception of the principle of confidentiality. However, the accountability penalty 
serves another and important function in providing ex-ante incentives, a role that seems to be ignored 
by the proponents of non-punitive systems. In addition, non-report penalties clearly represent 
incentives for self-reporting.
27 If we focus at the incentives for self-reporting only, and ignore ex-ante 
incentives, it is observed from eqs. (18-21) that the modifications undertaken worsen the incentives for 
self-reporting given an Absent non-report scheme, while the same incentive improves for 
Confidentiality and Immunity. For Voluntary reporting both a positive and negative effect is 
observed.
28 Confidentiality is the only system of the four that can ensure self-reporting for any 
parameter values, given that a sufficiently high non-report penalty is chosen. The above discussion 
makes clear that the non-report penalty shares similarities with penalties intended to ensure 
compliance with law, in that a higher value reduces the risk of law violation. The accountability 
penalty, on the other hand, has a different role. This penalty is to internalise the expected social 
                                                           
26 A non-punitive environment is believed to create thrust which strengthens the incentives for error reporting 
(see e.g. Cohen, 2000 and Reason, 2000). In our model this argument can be interpreted as if a non-punitive 
environment reduces the size ofb , only. If so, the incentives for self-reporting may well be strengthened, but 
need not be fulfilled since b λ may still exceed a. In addition, this argument ignores ex-ante incentives, which 
may be weakened due to a lower b.       
27 In some works non-punitive reporting programmes are believed to provide more useful information about 
errors than punitive programmes, since practitioners now can tell the complete story without fear of retribution 
(see e.g. Cohen, 2000).    
28 For Confidentiality this matters if  1 λ  is sufficiently low.    16
(patient) damages that accrue from errors. Very high penalty levels may trigger undesirable social 
behaviour (defensive medicine).   
 
4.  Institutional barriers 
Up to now, the regulator has been able to set the penalties at any desired level. However, this need not 
be possible since penalties in principle serve other purposes as well which may constitute obstacles in 
reaching first-best. The actual size of penalties face possible restrictions due to legitimacy, practical 
and political reasons, and notions of fairness (see e.g. Harrington, 1988). One example is the 
application of optimal negative penalties as suggested by the analysis in section 2, especially when the 
violation of a law involves recklessness or negligence. In the following, one particular institutional 
constraint is considered - the existence of binding upper limits. It is here chosen to focus at the case for 
which the non-report penalty can not be set according to the desired level, 
* ss > , where s is defined 
as a maximum limit. Consider for example the case of near misses, which in our model can be 
interpreted as if 0 L D = and  0 L q  . From (12) and (15), it now follows that 
* t should be low, while 
* s approaches infinity. This situation suggests an effective binding upper limit on the non-report 
penalty, consequently a second-best regime must be considered.  
 
First we discuss the role of ex-ante incentives. It is self-evident that it will be optimal for the regulator 
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We already know from (4) that both pay-offs (expected penalties) increase with t, and that the 
marginal increase is most significant for the expected pay-off given self-reporting behaviour (see eq. 
5). Consequently, a higher accountability penalty has a positive and a negative effect in welfare terms. 
First, an increase in preventive effort, due to a higher t, is positive in welfare terms if 
* ee < .   17
Secondly, the same increase induces a potential negative effect in welfare terms since the incentives 
for self-reporting are weakened.      
 
In order to define the exact relationship between changes in t and the incentives for self-reporting, 
four critical values of t are defined from the binding optimal self-report rule;    
 
ij ij i ij ij i br t aq r t q s += + + where  , iH L =  and  , jH L =           ( 2 5 )  
 











   where  , iH L =  and  , jH L =           ( 2 6 )  
 
ij t is defined as the highest possible value t can attain while on the same time induce physicians 
experiencing an error of type ij to self-report. From earlier assumptions ( HHH L rr > and  LHL L rr > ) it 
follows that  HLH H tt >  and  LHL L tt > . By introducing the two following assumptions; 
(I)           HHL HH LL L rrrr >>>   
(II)  (1 ) (1 ) HHH L HL rq rq −< −, 
 
the following ranking of the critical values matters;  HLH HL HL L tttt >>> . The critical value of tis 
highest for errors of type HL (adverse events and low quality of evidence). Such errors are associated 
with a high probability of being detected and a relatively low probability of being held liable. Both 
characteristics allow for t being relatively high without triggering a non-reporting decision. The types 
of errors being most exposed to non-reporting behaviour, and thus a low critical value oft, are errors 
of type LL (low social costs and low quality of evidence) for which both the detection probability and 
the liability probability are low. The definition and ranking of the critical values of t , now define 
regions for when physicians, experiencing particular types of error, will self-report. The results are 
summarised in table  2. 
 
It follows from table 2 that we have two pooling equilibria (one with self-reporting and one without 
reporting) and three separating equilibria. For a sufficiently low t (  LL tt ≤ ) and a sufficiently high t  
(  HL tt > ), all types of errors are self-reported or not reported, respectively.  For intermediate values of 
t , some type of errors is self-reported while others are not.  
   18
The next step is to derive the expected amount of information that relates to the same intervals of t. 
These results are available in table 2. It is now straightforward to show that  ABCDE I IIII >>>> , 
saying that the expected quantity of information decreases stepwise with a higher accountability 
penalty. 
 
Table 2: The relationships between the level of the liability penalty, self-reported error types, 
and the expected  quantity of information. 
               
Cases Intervals  of  t  Error types being  
self-reported  
Expected quantity of 
information 
A 
LL tt ≤⇒   LH, HH, HL and LL  1 A I =  
B 
LL LH tt t <≤ ⇒   LH, HH, and HL  (1 )[ (1 ) ] B L Iq ββ µµ =+− +−
C 
LH HH tt t <≤ ⇒   HH and HL    (1 ) CL I q β β =+−  
D 
HHH L tt t <≤   HL   (( 1 ) ) ( 1 ) D HL I qq βγ γ β =+ − + −
E 
HL tt >   None     (1 ) EH L I qq q β β =+ − ≡
 
 
The above discussion shows the presence of a regulator trade-off in t. In order to derive the second-
best level of t  we now introduce a social criteria function. The ethical problem, already commented 
upon in section 2 that arises from introducing social preferences is now less of a problem since the 
motive for inducing an effort level different from 
* e is to increase the degree of self-reporting among 
physicians and not to increase the expected number of errors. Regulator preferences defined 
(additively) over expected information quantity, ) , ( s t B , and expected social accountability costs, 
) , ( s t C
r , are as follows;
29   
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( s t C s t B s t W
r − =           ( 2 7 )  
 
To help identify the second best penalty a particular specification of the social costs function in (27) is 
chosen that relates these costs to a constant being equal to the minimum expected social costs; 
D e p e e C
r ) ( ) (
* * * + = . The social cost function is now,  ( )
2 * () ( ,)
rr Ce Ct s η − , where η is a weight 
parameter. Furthermore the benefit (information) function in (27) is assumed to equal  ) , ( s t kI  where 
k denotes the marginal welfare from additional information. 
                                                           
29 For ethical reasons it can be difficult to accept a reduction in preventive effort (lower than e
*) also when 
motivated by the need to increase self-reporting among physicians. Given that this is the case the second-best 
problem is reduced to setting of the level of t that induces e
*.    19
  Figure 2: Information benefits and deviation in expected accountability  
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The present regulator trade-off is illustrated in figure 2 and 3. Figure 2 describes both the development 
in information benefits and the development in social accountability relative to 
* ()
r Ce, for increasing 
values of t . It is observed that 
* ee = , corresponds to a value of tslightly higher than  HH t . For higher 
values of t, the expected accountability costs increase, due to defensive medicine. Information 
benefits, on the other hand, are declining stepwise for increasing values of t. Social welfare is 
described in figure 3. It is observed that the second-best penalty in this case is  LH t , which yields an 
under-investment of effort and a separating equilibria for which errors of type LH, HH and HL all are 
self-reported, while errors of type LL are not. The trade-off can also be illustrated by considering a 
lower value of t, e.g. t =  LL t . This particular value of tis sufficient low to make errors of type LL to 
be self-reported, however, as follows from figure 3, the gain in expected information is not sufficient 
to compensate for the increase in accountability costs that goes with less preventive effort.   
t  
(, ) kI t s  
*2 (( ) ( , ) )
rr Ce Ct s η −
t  
LL t   LH t   HH t HL t
(, ) Wts  20
In the following we will present a numerical solution for an additional example. Consider now the 
case where 
*
LH LH te e ⇒=  which implies that;    
* (, ) ( )
rr
LH Ct s Ce =                  ( 2 8 )      
 
We know from (28) that a penalty higher than  LH t induces defensive medicine, while on the same time 
errors of type LH will not be reported. Both effects reduce welfare, hence the second-best 
accountability penalty in this case must be equal to or less than  LH t  and the only relevant alternative to 
LH tt =  is  LL tt = . However, the expected increase in quantity of information that follows from a lower 
value of t will come at the expense of a reduction in preventive effort. In this perspective, choosing 
between  LH t and  LL t , reflects a trade-off in expected information and accountability.  
 
In the following it is assumed that () e x p
re Pe
− = , which yields the following first-order conditions for  
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Now an explicit expression for  (, ) LL Wt s can be derived by using (30) and the expression for the 
expected quantity of information when  LL tt =  (see case A in table 2). This procedure yields the 
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Following the same procedure for t = LH t yields social welfare equal to;  
 
[ ] (, ) ( 1 ) ( ( 1 ) LHL Wt s k q ββ µµ =+ − + −               ( 3 2 )  
 
The condition for the highest penalty ( LH t ) being the preferable one,  (, ) (, ) LH LL Wt s Wt s > , now 
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The numerator of (33) is always negative where the first term represents the difference in expected 
patient damages across the two cases (being negative since (, )
a
LL DR ts > ), while the second term 
(being positive) reflects the savings in effort investments that follow from a lower t.  The denominator 
of (33) is always negative and reflects differences in the expected quantity of information across the 
two penalty levels. It is observed that the probability of choosing the lowest penalty increases with the 
weight, η ,  and the lower the marginal increase in welfare from additional information, k, is.  
 
The above examples show how an institutional barrier on the non-report penalty may lower the 
accountability penalty. The regulator is forced to solve two contradicting effects with one instrument, 
only, as a result we may end up with a less punitive penalty scheme. The regulator can be said to be 
forced to go “soft” on accountability in order to encourage self-reporting. If the model of 
Confidentiality had been applied to analyse the impact from upper binding limits, the conclusion 
would be different. The trade-off from a higher t between information and preventive effort is now 
absent since the accountability penalty does not change the relative incentives for self-reporting. 
Hence, the second-best solution is to set t so that 
* ee = .    
 
5.     Conclusion  
The question of optimal liability policy is an important health policy issue for many reasons among 
them the increased importance given at efforts to health cost containment in many countries and the 
rise of managed care in the US. Recent publications conclude that medical errors are frequent, at 
unacceptably high levels, and involve significant patient discomfort and treatment costs. In addition 
the underreporting of such incidents is believed to represent a hindrance for collecting and analysing 
data to develop strategies for reducing the future problem of errors. In order to encourage the reporting 
of such incidents non-punitive principles have been recommended. In this work a simple analytical 
model is presented to analyse the role of incentives and control in combination with medical errors.  
 
It is shown that a scheme with two penalties, one addressing ex-ante incentives and one addressing ex-
post incentives, is sufficient to reach the first-best solution. The optimal penalty scheme needs not be a 
punitive one, since the optimal penalty levels can be insignificant and even negative depending on 
parameter levels. Voluntary reporting, immunity and confidentiality are also analysed, however, only 
confidentiality is found to have the optimal properties. The conclusions arrived at suggest that 
advocates of non-punitive mechanisms ignore the vital and legitimate role accountability has in   22
holding institutions responsible for their actions. Furthermore, it follows that non-punitive measures 
need not be effective in encouraging self-reporting behaviour.  
 
The optimal penalty scheme identified in this paper may involve significant penalty levels if; i) 
medical cultures can be described as non-reporting cultures, and ii) if the expected social costs that 
accrue from medical errors exceed health care workers feelings of remorse and shame following from 
the occurrence of medical errors. Such levels need not be practically attainable, in particular for the 
non-report penalty, in this way representing an upper bond for this penalty. Introducing an institutional 
limitation of this type into the model is found to create a downward pressure on the level of the 
accountability penalty, while the non-report is to be set as high as the upper bond allows.  
 
Our conclusions derive from a quite simple model, and several extensions are possible in future works. 
Examples here would be to analyse the role of risk preferences, to assume that preventive behaviour 
affects the probability distribution of patient costs from medical errors, and discuss what the 
implications are when informational gains depend both upon types of errors and how errors become 
common knowledge (self-reported or detected). This analysis shows that the continuing debate on tort 
reforms should go beyond the question of deterrence and address reporting incentives as well.  
   23








The above figure presents the possible outcomes (ex-ante) for a physician given the occurrence of a medical 
denoted by PE. A medical error can with probability 1 β −  be a near miss,  L D , and with probability β be an 
adverse event,  H D  . A fraction of all adverse events, 1 γ − , is characterised by a low quality of evidence while 
a fractionγ is characterised by a high quality of evidence.  After privately observing the type of error, each being 
associated with a particular probability,  ij r , of being held liable and penalised by t , the agent is to decide on 
whether to report or not report this particular incident to the health regulator. If not choosing to self-report the 
agent face the risk of being detected by probability  i q and penalised by  . s The penalty outcomes, for each 
possible case, are presented at the end of the system of arrows.      
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